Ordinary modal logic deals with the notion of a proposition being true in at least one possible world. This makes it natural to consider the notion of a proposition being true in n possible worlds for any nonnegative integer n. Such a notion would stand to Tarski's numerical quantifiers as ordinary possibility stands to the existential quantifier.
The logic GrK
The logic GrK is defined as follows. Formation rules: Formulas are constructed in the usual way from a set V of propositional variables p 1 , p 2 , . . ., the binary operator ∨ (or), the unary operators ¬ (not), (necessity) and ♦ n , n = 2, 3, . . ., and parentheses ( and ) .
Throughout the paper I observe some familiar conventions: A, B, C, with or without subscripts, range over formulas; →, ↔, ♦ (possibility) etc. are given standard definitions; all expressions are used autonomously; and parentheses are omitted from formulas in an obvious way. ♦ A is taken to mean "A is true in at least n possible worlds"; so ♦ =n A means "A is true in exactly n possible worlds" (see section 2). A means "A is a theorem of GrK". Transformation rules:
Axiom schemes (where n, m = 1, 2, . . .)
All tautologous formulas
Rules of inference. Modus Ponens. From A, A → B infer B Necessitation. From A infer A
Semantics
A frame is a pair W, R , where W (worlds) is a non-empty set and R (accessibility) is a binary relation on W . A model M is a pair F, π , where F is a frame and π (valuation) is a map from V (variables) to 2 W (set of worlds or propositions). Relative to each model M = W, R, π , we define the truth-relation |= as follows: for w ∈ W ,
A is valid, |= A, if for every model M and every world w ∈ W we have w |= A. M is a model for a set of formulas ∆ if, for some w ∈ W , we have w |= A for each A ∈ ∆.
A preliminary result
A set of formulas ∆ is a theory if each theorem of GrK is in ∆ and ∆ is closed under modus ponens. A theory ∆ is consistent if ¬A ∈ ∆ only when A / ∈ ∆, and complete if ¬A ∈ ∆ whenever A / ∈ ∆. Let Ω be the set of all consistent and complete theories. For n 1 we define the relations R n on Ω. For w, v ∈ Ω:
First we note three straightforward lemmas:
Lemma 1 is proved with the help of axiom 5; Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 1; and Lemma 3 is proved by axiom 3. Use of Lemmas 1 to 3 will often be tacit.
The next result states the crucial property of the relations R n . Let T w (A) (the truth-set of A) be
1 and w R v and A ∈ v}.
Theorem 1. For any n 1 and w ∈ Ω, we have:
Proof. (⇒) By induction on n. Induction base: n = 1. Assume ♦ 1 A ∈ w. Clearly, it suffices to show that for some v ∈ Ω, wR 1 v and A ∈ v. Let X = {B: B ∈ w} ∪ {A}. Assume that X is not consistent, i.e., its closure under modus ponens is an inconsistent theory. Then by axiom 1 and the Deduction Theorem, there are formulas B 1 , . . . , B k such that B 1 , . . . , B k ∈ w and
A ∈ w, contrary to the consistency of w. So, X is consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, X is contained in a consistent and complete theory v. Observe that A ∈ v and, by Lemma 2, wR 1 v, so we are done. Induction step: n > 1. Assume that the theorem holds for all i < n. Now suppose that ♦ n A ∈ w. By axiom 4, for every formula B there is an i n such that 
So X is consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, X is contained in a consistent and complete theory v ∈ Ω. By Lemma 2, wR n v. By Lemma 3, wR v for all 1 n. Hence v, ∈ T w (A) for all 1 n. Thus |T w (A)| n.
(⇐) By induction on n. Induction base: n = 1. Assume |T w (A)| 1. Suppose v, ∈ T w (A). Now A ∈ v and w R v. So ♦ A ∈ w. Hence ♦ 
Canonical models
The intuitive interpretation of w R n v is that there are at least n v-type worlds accessible from w, i.e. n worlds which are accessible from w and which are copies of (have the same truth-value assignments as) v. So let us say that f is a canonical mapping for a Kripke model M = W, R, π if f maps W onto Ω and satisfies two conditions:
Theorem 2. If f is a canonical mapping from a Kripke model M = W, R, π , then for any x ∈ W and any formula A, we have: M, x |= A ⇔ A ∈ f (x).
Proof. By induction on the length of A. The main case is
Now we define M = W, R, π by:
Theorem 3 (Completeness). A set of graded modal formulas is consistent iff it has a model.
Proof. (⇒) Assume ∆ is consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, for some w ∈ Ω, ∆ ⊆ w. So by theorem 2, w, 1 |= A for all A ∈ ∆, and ∆ has a model. (⇐) Straightforward.
Note that there are alternative ways of defining R above. For example, we could let w, R v, k iff k > and w R k− v. In this case the canonical structure M would be asymmetric.
Other logics
The above method can be applied to other logics L besides GrK. First we relativise to L all of the constructions and results up to theorem 2. Then we prove the analogue of theorem 3. This requires that R have certain properties, which will follow from the definition of M and the fact that each theory in Ω contains L. I shall outline this procedure for some logics below.
(I). GrT, given by GrK plus the axiom scheme A → A, and complete for all reflexive structures.
The definition of the canonical mapping f for M is as before, but with w, R v, k iff w = v, k and w R k+1− v, or w = v, k > and w R k− v.
Notice that R, so defined, is antisymmetric.
(II). GrKB, given by GrK plus the axiom scheme A → ♦A, and complete for all symmetric structures.
We now let X be the set of all sequences w 1 k 1 w 2 k 2 . . . k n−1 w n , n 1, such that w i ∈ Ω, k i ∈ N , and w i R k i +1 w i+1 if w i−1 exists and w i−1 = w i , and w i R k i w i+1 otherwise.
xRy iff y = x k w or x = y k w, and f (x) is the last term of x.
The above construction may be modified to show that GrKTB is complete for all reflexive and symmetric structures.
(III). We may also determine the logics which are complete for R being reflexive and transitive, reflexive and transitive and antisymmetric, linear etc. However, in all of these cases the completeness proofs are very much more difficult. It is worth noting that imposing antisymmetry on a reflexive and transitive relation makes a difference to one's logic. For example,
A becomes valid.
(IV). GrS5, given by GrT plus the axiom scheme ♦ n A → ♦ n A, complete for all reflexive, symmetric and transitive structures. Completeness for GrS5 can be proved by the above method and also by normal forms.
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Let QS5 be the logic obtained from S5 by adding propositional quantifiers which range over all sets of possible worlds. Then GrS5 has the interesting property that any formula of QS5 is equivalent to a formula of GrS5 (see [2] ).
Finally, it should be noted that standard techniques, or modifications of them, may be used to prove the decidability of most of the logics mentioned above.
